Iran on the brink

I look at the war from Iran's pov and sketch four scenarios for what might happen next

The Islamic Republic stands at a moment of profound internal uncertainty. The economy is battered. The succession to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is unresolved. The Revolutionary Guard dominates politics but has failed to deliver stability or growth. The regime remains in control, but the foundations beneath it—economic, ideological, and generational—are under literal assault.

That fragility opens the door to multiple futures. Iran could absorb the current shock and return to the gray zone of covert confrontation. It could strike a genuine strategic compromise—halting its nuclear program in exchange for survival. It could face rupture from within, whether via elite fracture, popular uprising, or external blowback. Or it could sprint for the bomb, betting that nuclear deterrence is the only path to regime continuity.

Each of these scenarios presents risks not just for Iran, but for the region and the world. And while no one—not even Iran—can control how this ends, it is increasingly clear that what happens inside the country will matter more than what flies out of it.

Scenario 1: De-escalation and Return to the Gray Zone

The natural human instinct—even in the middle of a war—is to believe that nothing has fundamentally changed, that things will eventually return to "normal." Every day the fighting continues, that instinct looks more naive. Still, it's possible that the near term holds no dramatic breakthrough, but rather a reversion to the long-running pattern of shadow conflict between Iran and Israel. Markets seem to reflect that belief: oil prices are down, Israeli stocks are up. Either investors don’t believe this will escalate further—or their heads are buried in the Persian sand.

Iran has strong incentives to de-escalate. Its economy cannot sustain a prolonged conflict. The regime faces growing pressure from a younger generation that increasingly sees its ideological commitments as obstacles to prosperity and freedom. A drawn-out war risks domestic unrest or elite fracture—especially if it brings further humiliation or isolation. Even within the IRGC, there is likely disagreement over how far to push, and at what cost.

For Israel, the logic of restraint is harder to justify. From a purely military perspective, Israel's campaign against Iranian proxies—and now Iran itself—has been remarkably successful. Still, Israeli leaders may conclude that the damage already inflicted is enough to reestablish deterrence without crossing a threshold that forces U.S. intervention or broader regional war. Some in the Israeli security establishment likely believe time is on their side: that technological superiority and sustained pressure will continue to degrade Iran and its proxies. In this view, the current conflict is not an outlier, but another turn in a long war of attrition.

But the gray zone is unstable by design. Every strike, every assassination, every nuclear milestone increases the risk of overreaction or unintended escalation. And every time the rules of the game are broken—as they have been over the past year—they become harder to reimpose. The longer this liminal war continues, the more it corrodes trust, accelerates arms races, and narrows the space for diplomacy.

In this scenario, Iran survives. The regime remains intact. But the underlying forces—economic malaise, political stagnation, generational alienation—remain unresolved. Survival is not the same as stability. And stepping back from the brink may only delay a reckoning the regime can no longer avoid.

Scenario 2: Strategic Compromise—A Trump-Backed Nuclear Deal

Iran may soon cry uncle. A recent Euronews report notes that "Iran is reaching out to mediators from Oman and Qatar," while U.S. President Trump—who called for “peace soon”—stated, "I hope Israel and Iran can broker a deal… sometimes they have to fight it out, but we’re gonna see what happens," and referenced planned U.S.–Iran nuclear talks in Oman. (How Iranian officials are supposed to get to Oman given Israeli air dominance and the recent assassination of Iran’s chief negotiator is a detail Trump conveniently omits—underscoring the unlikelihood of an imminent breakthrough.)

Iran is under extraordinary pressure. The intensity of Israel’s onslaught—targeting senior commanders, civilian infrastructure, and territory inside Iran—has exposed the regime’s vulnerability in a way not seen since the Iran-Iraq War. In this context, a negotiated deal may be less about strategic repositioning and more about survival. Iran’s economy has been under pressure for years, and further escalation risks both popular unrest and elite fracture. A diplomatic off-ramp that halts enrichment in exchange for tangible concessions—such as unfreezing assets or restoring access to global markets—would give the regime a way to pause the conflict, reduce immediate threats, and regroup. For Iran’s leadership, the choice may no longer be between war and peace, but between negotiation and collapse.

For any agreement to hold, it must clear a high bar. Verification must be ironclad: intrusive IAEA inspections, strict enrichment limits, and robust monitoring at sites like Fordow and Natanz. Sanctions relief must be immediate and tangible—unfreezing assets, restarting oil exports, and reconnecting Iran to global financial networks. Security guarantees, even tacit ones, will be crucial: Iran will need some assurance that compliance won’t invite further Israeli attacks.

But obstacles abound. Israel is unlikely to accept a deal that leaves any part of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure intact. Netanyahu’s government does not trust Iranian compliance. In Washington, even with Trump leading the charge, domestic politics remain volatile—especially if the deal resembles the 2015 JCPOA. Within Iran, hardliners may resist any agreement forged under fire.

Still, if the regime concludes its survival depends on compromise, it may swallow short-term political costs for long-term stability. That shift—from open conflict to negotiated pause—won’t end the rivalry. But it could end this phase of the war and, in doing so, deliver something close to what Trump has promised from the start: “peace soon.” A classic case of kicking the can down the road.

Scenario 3: Regime Collapse or Succession Crisis

The Islamic Republic has faced protests, sanctions, and isolation before. But today feels different—not because pressure is higher, but because the system itself is weaker. Khamenei is in his mid-80s. His succession is unresolved. And while the regime retains control of key institutions, its legitimacy among the public is visibly eroding.

A succession crisis could unfold quietly—an elite deal to install a new Supreme Leader and preserve continuity. Or it could explode: a coup, an Israeli assassination, a popular uprising, or cascading defections.

The protest movements of 2009, 2017–18, 2019, and 2022 revealed deep, generational dissatisfaction. Those uprisings were crushed. But in a moment of elite fracture, that same energy could prove decisive. A convergence of public anger and regime paralysis could lead to collapse.

What comes next is unknowable. Iran could fracture into regional power centers. It could fall under military rule. Or it could be reborn—more open, more liberal, more connected to the world. A post-Islamic Republic Iran could embrace reform and pluralism. The diaspora could help rebuild what decades of ideological rigidity have hollowed out.

Regime change does not guarantee chaos—but neither does it ensure progress. The Islamic Republic may fall not to bombs or sanctions, but to its own internal contradictions. What replaces it could be better, worse, or just different.

Scenario 4: Nuclear Breakout

The most dangerous scenario may also be the most likely: that Iran chooses to sprint for a nuclear weapon. It wouldn’t be the first regime to see nukes as its only guarantee of survival. North Korea did. Israel, albeit under different conditions, arguably did too.

Iran is closer than ever. It has enriched uranium to near-weapons grade. It has long-range missile technology. It has the technical expertise. The final step is political, not scientific.

Breakout could come in response to Israeli escalation or the threat of U.S. involvement. Tehran could frame it as deterrence, but the effect would be the same: a nuclear-armed Iran, and likely regional proliferation in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey. No state has used a nuclear weapon since the U.S. against Japan in 1945. But if Israel begins razing parts of Tehran, the regime may calculate it has no choice.

From the regime’s perspective, a bomb is an insurance policy. Once you have one, perhaps even the mere threat of use compels Israel to stop. (Of course, it could also set off a nuclear tit-for-tat…the worst-case scenario.)

IF – and it’s a huge IF – Iran can sprint to a nuclear weapon, based on the level of Israeli military action, the hint of potential U.S. involvement, and the weakness of the regime – this may be the most likely scenario right now. But without specific intelligence on Iran’s nuclear, it remains a best guess, not a confident forecast.

What Comes After the Fire

No one can say where this ends. The Iran-Israel conflict is now open, direct, and dangerously unstable. The Islamic Republic is fighting for its regional posture and its internal coherence. The outcome will not be decided solely in the air or on the battlefield.

The four scenarios outlined here are not predictions. They are plausible futures. Iran may de-escalate and return to covert conflict. It may strike a deal. It may collapse. It may go nuclear. None of these outcomes are inevitable. All are consequential.

Israel may believe it is winning. But history is full of countries that won the tactical fight and lost the strategic one. In trying to destroy the Islamic Republic, Israel may accelerate its evolution into something more dangerous: harder to deter, more competent, or more desperate. Or Israel may succeed in bringing the United States directly into the fight—and tip the balance decisively.

Ultimately, Iran’s future won’t be written in bunkers or war rooms. It will be shaped in the streets of Mashhad, the seminaries of Qom, and the imaginations of the Iranian people. Will they blame the Supreme Leader? Will they blame Israel for bombing them? Will they blame both?

This is where geopolitics must drop the pretense of science, because it is about how Iranians themselves will respond, which will be driven by personal, emotional, and instinctual views. What emerges from this crucible may insha’allah surprise us – hope springs eternal – but let’s conclude there before wishful thinking takes us too far off course.