This is the art of geopolitics, isn't it? I was listening to the MacroVoices podcast last week with Anas Alhajji, who I generally like as an energy analyst. The conversation started with the host suggesting his idea that Iran was not powerful enough militarily to shut down the strait was clearly wrong, and he took issue and went on a rant about how it was all due to insurance regulations. He must have missed your Geopolitical Cousin's episode with the tanker analyst! He then spun a long argument about "dark forces" making this conflict "all about China".
It's hard not to just admit being wrong, but it's hard to give up a well-crafted narrative. We tend to hold on to such a narrative until it becomes impossible to maintain. One way I try to do it is to think, at the outset, that no event has a single causal factor, and that a factor I might consider minor can rear its ugly head and destroy the carefully built story. If you think about the standard regression equation, the error term, or "epsilon" is where all the evil things that can emerge live.
Knowing when to "hold 'em or fold 'em" is difficult. I try to use guideposts, such as "if x occurs, then the odds are increasing that I am wrong" can work. I just read the Department of War is sending ground troops to the region. This increases the odds that this will go sideways and longer.
Finally, at my place up in Wisconsin, we had a blizzard last week; +20 inches of snow...
Dr. Anas is correct, and Jacob has shown a lack of understanding of the situation since the very beginning of the crisis in January.
As much as I enjoy listening to him and following his work, his forecasts were: first, “No war” — “Not impressed” — and then, “No more than three weeks.”
However, the White House published its National Strategy in November 2025, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz and Iran.
This is a planned war, and the plan appears to be working.
Trump aims to “Make America Great Again” by forcing all the actors involved to pay the U.S. for protection, trade, energy, and more.
I'd differ with your characterization of the NSS but yes, I didn't get this right...that's what the whole post is about, a course correction. Won't always be correct but at least I can know when I'm off and try to fix.
Really interesting and refreshing take! Another argument I would make: putting myself in the IRGC shoes, my main incentive is to stay alive. An end to the war could lead to people going back on the streets after this mess. Wouldn't this push me to keep this war going to keep domestic troubles low? Ideally, keeping to conflict in a perpetual low intensity mode. What do you think?
Thanks for sharing this. I like how you’re working through this in real time, especially the shift from what “should” happen geopolitically to how leaders are actually interpreting the moment. What this brought up for me is that the tension you’re describing feels less like a miss on constraints and more like a shift in what counts as tolerable risk.
A lot of the analysis assumes the U.S. sees escalation as something to avoid because of cost, duration, and second-order effects. But it may be that those constraints are being reinterpreted rather than ignored. Short-term disruption, even at scale, might be seen as acceptable if it resets leverage or forces alignment elsewhere. That would explain why the asymmetric disadvantage you’re pointing to is acknowledged but not decisive in the way the base case assumes. The system is not misreading the risk, it may be pricing it differently. Which makes the question less about whether the war can stay short, and more about whether the U.S. actually wants it to.
One can interpret Trump's truth social post (to Iran) as.... "don't do anything to hinder the South Pars oil field production or (SO?) we can obliterate it"
A tell that LNG is a huge part if this in my opinion.
Very enjoyable read, but there's a bit of a strawman dynamic in the casual reputation of the "China" and "deindustrialization" theses.
Re: China, it isn't so much a question of energy imports as of regional control. Note that Iran is still permitting transit to tankers bound for China. The "oil import" dimension is prominent because of chronological proximity to the Venezuela operation, where control of Venezuelan energy exports was a foremost objective. Iran is a critical nexus for China's Belt & Road Initiative, both land and maritime routes. And Iran as the regional proxy for China / Russia against the other GCC is a threat to the petrodollar. Note that Iran is requiring payment in yuan for transit of friendly nations through the Strait already. If Iran supersedes Saudi Arabia for regional dominance, with corollaries of Shiite over Sunni political empowerment in the Gulf, the orientation of Middle Eastern energy changes drastically. Saudi Arabia clearly understands the risk. The West does, too. Modern OPEC was a lynchpin in the Western victories for both World Wars, because of logistical perseverance made possible by access to energy supplies.
Re: deglobalization / reindustrialization: Trump doesnt need to play 4D chess. If lobbyists paint a narrative he likes around an objective they want, Trump's own rationale is a means to an end. Domestic energy producers are hitting all-time-highs. American producers with exposure to spot prices are in a very advantageous position. And if the Gulf is going to fall from American sway, then American realpolitik means eliminating as much of the treasure before the enemy takes it. Hence the increasing number of strikes on energy assets. It creates global pain in rising energy prices, but the US is much less vulnerable than the ROTW. European and east Asian dependency on US LNG and oil imports is an immediate result. It becomes a point of leverage to enforce compliance with US objectives in an escalating cold war with China. Absent the energy wedge, Europe trends towards appeasement and even collaboration, only principally concerned with Russia in Ukraine. Japan is rearming already against the threat of China in its sphere of influence, but the energy dimension creates (forces) more reliable alignment of interest, around the US policy agenda.
Whether these hypotheticals manifest as outlined is a separate question. The fact that they are logically coherent means they shouldn't be dismissed out of hand as relevant.
This is the art of geopolitics, isn't it? I was listening to the MacroVoices podcast last week with Anas Alhajji, who I generally like as an energy analyst. The conversation started with the host suggesting his idea that Iran was not powerful enough militarily to shut down the strait was clearly wrong, and he took issue and went on a rant about how it was all due to insurance regulations. He must have missed your Geopolitical Cousin's episode with the tanker analyst! He then spun a long argument about "dark forces" making this conflict "all about China".
It's hard not to just admit being wrong, but it's hard to give up a well-crafted narrative. We tend to hold on to such a narrative until it becomes impossible to maintain. One way I try to do it is to think, at the outset, that no event has a single causal factor, and that a factor I might consider minor can rear its ugly head and destroy the carefully built story. If you think about the standard regression equation, the error term, or "epsilon" is where all the evil things that can emerge live.
Knowing when to "hold 'em or fold 'em" is difficult. I try to use guideposts, such as "if x occurs, then the odds are increasing that I am wrong" can work. I just read the Department of War is sending ground troops to the region. This increases the odds that this will go sideways and longer.
Finally, at my place up in Wisconsin, we had a blizzard last week; +20 inches of snow...
Dr. Anas is correct, and Jacob has shown a lack of understanding of the situation since the very beginning of the crisis in January.
As much as I enjoy listening to him and following his work, his forecasts were: first, “No war” — “Not impressed” — and then, “No more than three weeks.”
However, the White House published its National Strategy in November 2025, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz and Iran.
This is a planned war, and the plan appears to be working.
Trump aims to “Make America Great Again” by forcing all the actors involved to pay the U.S. for protection, trade, energy, and more.
I'd differ with your characterization of the NSS but yes, I didn't get this right...that's what the whole post is about, a course correction. Won't always be correct but at least I can know when I'm off and try to fix.
Jacob - and that’s why i love you man…
I worked for a guy who used to say “there’s nothing wrong with being wrong but a lot wrong with staying that way”.
If you don’t make any calls you won’t ever be wrong. But you won’t have much value either.
Really interesting and refreshing take! Another argument I would make: putting myself in the IRGC shoes, my main incentive is to stay alive. An end to the war could lead to people going back on the streets after this mess. Wouldn't this push me to keep this war going to keep domestic troubles low? Ideally, keeping to conflict in a perpetual low intensity mode. What do you think?
Tic tic tic tic tic. One week to the giant US toll booth on Trump Gulf.
Thanks for sharing this. I like how you’re working through this in real time, especially the shift from what “should” happen geopolitically to how leaders are actually interpreting the moment. What this brought up for me is that the tension you’re describing feels less like a miss on constraints and more like a shift in what counts as tolerable risk.
A lot of the analysis assumes the U.S. sees escalation as something to avoid because of cost, duration, and second-order effects. But it may be that those constraints are being reinterpreted rather than ignored. Short-term disruption, even at scale, might be seen as acceptable if it resets leverage or forces alignment elsewhere. That would explain why the asymmetric disadvantage you’re pointing to is acknowledged but not decisive in the way the base case assumes. The system is not misreading the risk, it may be pricing it differently. Which makes the question less about whether the war can stay short, and more about whether the U.S. actually wants it to.
One can interpret Trump's truth social post (to Iran) as.... "don't do anything to hinder the South Pars oil field production or (SO?) we can obliterate it"
A tell that LNG is a huge part if this in my opinion.
Very enjoyable read, but there's a bit of a strawman dynamic in the casual reputation of the "China" and "deindustrialization" theses.
Re: China, it isn't so much a question of energy imports as of regional control. Note that Iran is still permitting transit to tankers bound for China. The "oil import" dimension is prominent because of chronological proximity to the Venezuela operation, where control of Venezuelan energy exports was a foremost objective. Iran is a critical nexus for China's Belt & Road Initiative, both land and maritime routes. And Iran as the regional proxy for China / Russia against the other GCC is a threat to the petrodollar. Note that Iran is requiring payment in yuan for transit of friendly nations through the Strait already. If Iran supersedes Saudi Arabia for regional dominance, with corollaries of Shiite over Sunni political empowerment in the Gulf, the orientation of Middle Eastern energy changes drastically. Saudi Arabia clearly understands the risk. The West does, too. Modern OPEC was a lynchpin in the Western victories for both World Wars, because of logistical perseverance made possible by access to energy supplies.
Re: deglobalization / reindustrialization: Trump doesnt need to play 4D chess. If lobbyists paint a narrative he likes around an objective they want, Trump's own rationale is a means to an end. Domestic energy producers are hitting all-time-highs. American producers with exposure to spot prices are in a very advantageous position. And if the Gulf is going to fall from American sway, then American realpolitik means eliminating as much of the treasure before the enemy takes it. Hence the increasing number of strikes on energy assets. It creates global pain in rising energy prices, but the US is much less vulnerable than the ROTW. European and east Asian dependency on US LNG and oil imports is an immediate result. It becomes a point of leverage to enforce compliance with US objectives in an escalating cold war with China. Absent the energy wedge, Europe trends towards appeasement and even collaboration, only principally concerned with Russia in Ukraine. Japan is rearming already against the threat of China in its sphere of influence, but the energy dimension creates (forces) more reliable alignment of interest, around the US policy agenda.
Whether these hypotheticals manifest as outlined is a separate question. The fact that they are logically coherent means they shouldn't be dismissed out of hand as relevant.
Answer: Doritos Locos Tacos, always. Make a run for the border!